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Whereas the new millennium brought with it a focus on “collision rules” within global governance and 
corporate governance, the economic crises emerging out of 2008 turned the focus to the failure of 
regulatory practices. The current crises challenge not only a neoliberal hegemony but the New 
Deal/Great Society coordinating state model as well; as we have moved not only beyond a society of 
individuals to a society of organizations. We live now in a society of transnational network contracting 
and corporate governance practices. This society of networks can no longer be clearly associated with 
traditional conceptions of state, market or civil society/ public versus private. Amidst this crisis, 
emerging legal challenges can no longer be coped with by institutions and ritualized routines of laissez-
faire liberalism, social liberalism or neoliberalism. This paper redirects focus to an increasingly 
disembedded style of contracting amidst multi-polar and multi-rational regimes of conflict regulation/ 
dispute resolution. In doing so this paper starts from the prism of contracting practices and rituals: 
arguing that an understanding of how the discourse of “governing contracts” is continually and 
irreversibly implicated in the evolution of a network of heterarchical private relationships and public 
institutions.  
 
By 1930, Weimar legal scholars on the left like Franz Neumann and on the right Carl Schmitt had posed 
the related issues of pluralism, heterogeneity in complexity, and heterarchy versus hierarchy as the core 
issues in the new twentieth century. In the Anglo-American tradition, this argument was taken up most 
prominently by Harold Laski. Succinctly, the legal and political challenges is one of “complementary 
institutions” (Schmitt’s jurisprudential term). Complementary institutions come to force amidst the 
background of “principal institutions” such as the partnership, the firm and the individual prerogative 
contract that they were originally intended to augment and serve through auxiliary legal interpretations 
and practices. 
In the absence of an internationally agreed-upon labor regime, current practices of transnational 
standard-setting, especially in the setting of labor law norms, involves essentially the privatization of 
self-regulation. (Peer Zumbansen:”The Transnational Laws of Corporate Governance & Labor Rights”, 
2005.) Numerous transnational institutions/actors have been linking international labor rights with trade 
liberalization initiatives. Transnational standard-setting has become essentially inter-corporate/ trans-
corporate codes of conduct. At the turn of the twentieth century, Max Weber observed significantly, that 
in contrast to the “hard law” of an official state-based constitutional order, there had emerged in the law-
creating capacity of autonomous collective associations a new domain of “soft law” serving as 
constituted supervening norms.  
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Further, Philip Selznick by 1969 started to use the term reflexive law to refer to the necessary 
“regulation in the procedural coordinating of open networks of reciprocal complexity and 
interdependence. (See here the ongoing theorizing of Charles Sabel who raises the question: How are 
benchmarked norms and autonomous reflexive law continually bootstrapped?  
 
Private governance codes in an epoch of global capitalism are by and large not the result of bargaining, 
but the ultimate discretionary action of corporations. Thus, transnational standard-setting is increasingly 
challenging the traditional capacity of domestic labor law: that is, law within a national set of borders. 
Transnational standard-setting and transnational private law are constructed outside formal government 
rule-making as a regime of contextual preferentiality, a veritable set of self-enforcing norms of 
reciprocity (SERN). Such transnational practices include: performance standards; interoperability 
standards; ratcheting labor standards; ecological standards. Transnational law represents an emergent 
semi-autonomous self-regulating subsystem within a complexly differentiated global society of states 
and networks. This complexity amounts to a heterarchical rather than a hierarchical ordering with new 
modes of monitioring interest representation and the securing of transparency. French economists refer 
to these norms as normes de reciprocite auto-executoires and introduce a new economic concept: 
reciproqueteurs. (Cf. the rational choice theorizing of Elinor Ostrom.) 
  
Where institutional complementarity, as well as the interdiscursivity and interoperability of SERN 
proceduralism come to predominate we advisably need to consider Chris Ansell’s notion of network 
institutionalism (2006) which resists centralized or dirigiste administration. Network institutionalism 
recognizes that network interactions are more diffuse than discrete, more social than interpersonal. In 
contrast to a simplistic neoliberal approach rooted in the naturalness of markets, network institutionalism 
emphasizes the significance of normative commitment and committedness to trust and credibility. 
Argumentation networks involve more than just bargaining. They emphasize persuasion and 
justifiability through warranted assertions and generalizable norms. Mutual monitoring and learning 
among network participants is encouraged along with a sense of mutual accountability and dedication to 
improve performance.  
 
Institutional complementarity can also be understood in what is referred to as reflexive governance by 
Guenther Teubner: who presently holds the London School of Economics labour law chair held by 
Franz Neumann’s fellow Weimar labor lawyer comrade and Schmitt student, Otto Kahn-Freund. 
Network institutions reciprocally compensate for each other’s own deficiency. Complementary 
institutions can reinforce each other’s effects as a set of visible, trusted and credible autonomous 
institutional practices.  
 
As Harry Arthurs,the Canadian labor law colleague of Peer Zumbansen at Osgoode Hall, noted at a 
UCLA comparative law forum – paraphrasing a French general witnessing the “charge of the light 
brigade” at Sebastopol in The Crimean War: “It’s magnificent, bit is it war?” Transnational network 
standard-setting is overwhelming, but is it law? Beyond their medical bretheren, are legal professionals 
increasingly lawyers sans frontiers ? Is everything polycontextural? Is anything law?  
 
The gravity shift to autonomous subsystemic self-regulation of floating regional and global networks is 
rooted in standards and “best practices”, similar in the United States with The Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC)in the American contract law of fair trade usages.which prevails. The UCC is itself 
established by the autonomous American Law Institute of jurists, lawyers and law professors. There has 
been a renaissance of Lex Mercatoria: the customary law of merchants and traders operating abroad – 
and more specifically, transnational arbitration having some legal justification in domestic national 
courts. Lex Mercatoria involves to a great extent common sense “good faith’ business practices and 
standards used to regulate or resolve commercial conflicts.  
 
International Journal of Business and Social Science                                Vol. 2 No. 7; [Special Issue –April 2011] 
141 
 
As such, Lex Mercatoria is a confidential non-formalistic system of alternative dispute resolution 
centered on private arbitration courts – with an emphasis on the commercial ethic of an embedded global 
liberalism of the Washington free trade consensus of 1945. The new conflict of laws practice that has 
emerged beyond traditional federalism is found in arbitral codes of non-formalistic discretionary ruling 
and interpretation; and amounts to a new form of court shopping.  
 
The International Chamber of Commerce reports 550 filings and 300 awards under the newly emerging 
UCC of transnational commercial law: UNIDROIT –that is, the “Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts.” This started informally in the 1970s and became codified in 1994. Also reported is the 
growth in private arbitral courts for transnational commercial dispute resolution: 10 in 1910; 100 in 
1985; over 150 in 2005.  
 
Transnational arbitration houses become substitutes for national constitutional courts. Arbitral authority 
and enforcement are turned to for legal certainty and predictable outcomes. Arbitral practices are 
consolidated into stable rules and procedures of transnational law: as Philip Jessop predicted in his 
prescient Storrs Lectures at the Yale Law School in 1956. In some cases, arbitrators are pushed to 
maximize values other than the parties’ private right to contract: pace Richard Posner and the “law and 
economics movement” in jurisprudence.  
 
Guenther Teubner sees the new Lex Mercatoria as aa corporatist legal form: a functional hierarchy of 
preference, to mix Ostrom and Karl Renner. Where Teubner sees us moving to is a 
heterarchical/multilateral global society of networks: where there is cybernetic coordination (“structural 
coupling”) amidst spontaneous exogenous adaptation and evolving endogenous encapsulated pressures. 
Rather than Friedrich von Hayek’s society of spontaneous private law creation, Teubner avoids 
separation of spontaneous making of law, convention, habit and custom from constructivist making of 
public law by governments and autonomous social law by functionally differentiated subsystems; 
autopoeisis in the language of Teubner’s mentor Niklas Luhmann. We move from a hierarchy of law to 
a polyarchy or heterarchy of legal pluralism.  
 
What Teubner and Luhmann refer to in cybernetic terms as polycontextural logoc (PCL). With this 
superseding of traditional nom-producing routines Teubner argues that there is a decline in the 
legitimacy of the “rule of law”: what Jurgen Habermas refers to as the fundamental validity claims of 
law are incrementally eroded. Teubner sees the shrinking potential of nation state politics vis a vis the 
economy as a globalized self-deconstruction of the law-making process. The results are regimes of 
autonomous law. In globalized capitalism, autonomous private law is transformable into the governance 
of autonomous social law that goes beyond the “social law” ideas of the Weimar labor lawyers like 
Neumann and Kahn-Freund. The functional differentiation described incrementally by Durkheim, 
Parsons, Eisenstadt and Luhmann now include regimes of norm and law creation in the differentiated 
domains of science, technology, medicine, education, media, the Internet, and transportation.  
 
Contracts as Zumbansen reminds us (2007) are social arrangements that visibilize and negotiate 
conflicting rationalities and interests. Under the hegemony of neoliberalism, contracting has been 
interpreted formalistically, not sociologically, as the Legal Realists of The New Deal did. Expert 
managerialism functionally applied is extracted from its Progressive/ Social Democrat shell. 
Privatization and individual responsibility is emphasized domestically, while global private regimes are 
constructed outside.  
 
Governance by relational and network contracts have become the central regulatory concept: not 
government by public administrative agencies. Governance by contract provides the arrangement of 
exchanges. Governance by contract attends to the regulation of exchanges.  
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Society is no longer seen as having a center or an apex. Society is understood as being comprised not by 
a collective conscience, but multiple yet non-unified institutionalizing social reality constructions: 
multiple rationalities. Multilateral/ multipolar. Multirational/ subsystemic/ subcultural.  
 
To conclude, Zumbansen like Teubner sees law as normative in a pluralistic or polycontextural manner. 
Law’s content is not just singularly defined by market rationalism, religious fundamentalism, or social 
justice. Law reflects and regulates societal conflicts by “addressing” the internal codes involved 
subsystemically or subculturally. Zumbansen in “The Law of Society: Governance through Contract” 
(CLPE: Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto: 2007: p.45) affirms that  
 
“It [the law] is always exposed to and involved in these[social] conflicts. As such, it could be said that 
the law , instead of reflecting the values of individualism, collectivism or communitarianism in its 
totality will only in parts reflect these or other social values.”  
 
Contract involves obligation, not just exchange. Obligation is not solely defined by markets, property 
relations and commodity exchange. Zumbansen and Teubner present an alternative understanding of 
contracting as “structural coupling” and “reconciling” among social subsystems and their norms and 
values, as well as intersubjective reciprocity and mutual recognition within units of social subsystems. 
The institutional complementarity and polycontexturality immanent within the governance of socil law 
endures.  
 
APPENDIX:  
 
As detailed scholarly by Ostrom, Ian Macneil and Oliver Williamson, relational contracts unlike 
traditional discrete contracts between two or more legal individuals (including legal fictions for firms 
known as corporations) do not define discrete transactions. Rather they are normative frameworks 
defining the manner in which commercial exchanges ought to operate in practice. They do not focus on 
exchange that takes place at one point of time. Rather they take a multi-year holistic and “blanketing” 
approach to ongoing exchanges and performance. In more recent economics, this form of contracting 
unlike neo-classical “total market” stress relationships of trust, reciprocity, integrity, solidarity, and 
flexibility. Increasingly many relational contracts have become known as network contracts. Further, 
Charles Sabel uses the concept “braiding” to denote institutional complementary use of pre-existing 
practices of reciprocity, mutuality and solidarity of informal contractual agreements as endogenous trust 
considerations within formal contracting agreements of private and social law. 
